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I. CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
It is surely one of the ironies of President Bill Clinton's remarkable
career that he will be remembered both as the leader who helped save
the Democratic Party from a near fatal lack of resolve on fighting crime
and as a chief victim of a governmental culture obsessed with detecting
and punishing crime. Clinton's saga is only one part of the story of how a
great fear of crime and a powerful passion to punish have reshaped the
dynamics of American elections and, ultimately, the administration of
government at the federal and state levels during the last thirty years.
Signs of this transformation were present far earlier than the 1990s. In
1964, presidential candidate Barry Goldwater's acceptance speech at the
Republican National Convention addressed crime in the streets and a
general threat to law and order in what he labeled the permissive climate
of the early 1960s.' Goldwater lost by a landslide,2 but the victorious
Democrat, Lyndon Johnson, wasted little time in appointing a national
t Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. See E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE PoLmcs 179 (1991) ("Tonight, there is
violence in our streets, corruption in our highest offices, aimlessness among our youth, anxiety
among our elderly, and there's a virtual despair among the many who look beyond material
successes toward the inner meaning of their lives.") (quoting Barry Goldwater, Acceptance
Speech at the Republican National Convention (July 15,1964)).
2. His speech is primarily remembered for his embrace of extremism. "[E]xtremism in the
defense of liberty is no vice... [M]oderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue." DIONNE, su-
pra note 1, at 179 (quoting Barry Goldwater, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National
Convention (July 15,1964)).
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crime commission to document the crime problem and recommend effec-
tive strategies for managing it.
3
In 1968, Republican Richard Nixon made law and order a central is-
sue in his campaign and defeated Democrat Hubert Humphrey, who ex-
pressed a preference for spending government money on school teachers
instead of police officers.4 Despite Nixon's expressed intentions, the im-
plementation of strategies designed to reduce crime were complicated by
a multitude of issues, including urban riots, busing for integration, cam-
pus disturbances, and the Vietnam War.
It was not until the 1980s that crime and punishment emerged from
the multitude of "social issues" to become dominant elements in political
campaigns. Both Presidents Reagan and Bush7 embraced punishment as
one of the few forms of domestic governance defensible within their po-
litical ideology.8 As presidential candidates, both men castigated Demo-
crats and other liberals for having too much sympathy for criminal de-
fendants and offenders, a strategy that helped secure their respective
victories. The effectiveness of this type of campaign tactic was not limited
to national politics, it also proved to be a winning formula for Republican
candidates in state elections.9
Despite early efforts like that of President Johnson's crime commis-
sion, Democrats have generally found themselves losers in the reconfigu-
ration of politics around crime and punishment.0 Though many Demo-
crats in Congress voted for the crime bills introduced by Presidents
Reagan and Bush," and Democrats at the state level generally supported
increases in prisons and prison sentences, their party was wounded dur-
3. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIrY (1967).
4. This is a position practically unimaginable for a credible Democratic contender in the
Clinton years. See Harry A. Chernoff, The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 534
(1996).
5. See BEN J. WATENBERG, VALUES MATTER MOST 97-99 (1995) (defining social issues
as including crime, welfare, public order, and schools).
6. See KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 50-51 (1997) (arguing that Reagan's rhetoric contrasted law enforcement
and punishment with welfare as appropriate forums for government intervention); THE REAL
WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 115
(Stephen R. Donziger ed., 1996) (stating that Reagan saw the war on drugs as filling the public's
demand for government to be "tough and go on the offensive").
7. See BECKETT, supra note 6, at 48.
8. See Chernoff, supra note 4, at 533-35.
9. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 79-81.
10. See WATTENBERG, supra note 5, at 37-38 (discussing the failure of the Democratic
Party to take the crime issue seriously).
11. See DIONNE, supra note 1, at 297.
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ing the 1980s by the perception that it was too soft on criminals and insuf-
ficiently sensitive to the fear of violent crime felt by ordinary citizens.12
This disability came to be symbolized by President Bush's 1988 vic-
tory over former Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis." Dukakis,
thought to be the Democratic Party's best chance to recapture the presi-
dency in years, led in some polls by as many as seventeen points during
the summer preceding the election. Dukakis soon saw his lead and heady
expectations crushed, however, by the crime issue personified by con-
victed murderer Willie Horton." Horton was a Massachusetts prisoner
on a weekend furlough who terrorized a couple and raped a woman
shortly before the 1988 election. The image of a dangerous killer being
released from prison to prey on an unsuspecting family was used by Du-
kakis opponents to cast the Democratic Party as out of touch with the
fears of ordinary law-abiding citizens and unable to inflict the punish-
ments supported by such citizens.15
Additionally, the fact that Willie Horton was an African-American
sent out signals about crime and race.16 Political commercials using pho-
tographs of Horton were perceived by Dukakis supporters and other ob-
servers as an effort to invoke the historically significant icon of "black
crime" as a threat to American society. 7 At a minimum, the Horton case
caused some white voters to question whether Democrats were too wed-
ded to liberalism and civil rights to undertake the tough policies neces-
sary to check violent crime. 8 In 1992, President Clinton won in large part
because he neutralized the crime issue with an early embrace of tough
punishment and the undeniable credential of having authorized an exe-
cution as governor of Arkansas.
The politics of crime and punishment has not been limited to elec-
tions, however. Rather, politicians' increasing focus on these issues has
penetrated the broad operation of government in a number of ways.'9
First, the remarkable expansion of both state and federal prison popula-
12. See BECKETr, supra note 6, at 48 (discussing Reagan's argument that liberals treat
criminals as if they were the victims of social disadvantage).
13. See WATrENBERG, supra note 5, at 35-39.
14. See id.
15. See SUSAN ESTRICH, GETrNG AWAY wrrH MURDER 65-67 (1998). In fact, such fur-
lough programs were not uncommon in that period and had been adopted in states controlled
by Republicans as well as those controlled by Democrats. See WATrENBERG, supra note 5, at
38.
16. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 100.
17. See DIONNE, supra note 1, at 77 (quoting Susan Estrich's comment on the symbolism of
the Willie Horton case).
18. See BECKEIr, supra note 6, at 5 (commenting on the Bush campaign's manipulation of
the Willie Horton incident).
19. See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM: ESSAYS
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher eds., 1997).
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tions is reshaping the body politic and the social body. Nearly three per-
cent of all adults in the United States were in some form of correctional
custody in 1995. o0
The impact of this trend on the status of particular demographic
groups is even more significant. For example, more than a third of all
young African-American males were under correctional custody in the
early 1990s.21 This trend has had a striking impact on the economic vi-
ability of those who are imprisoned as well as on the communities in
which they are concentrated after release. One of the most disturbing
ramifications of the trend is that the increase in incarceration has caused
a significant portion of young African-American males to lose their right
to vote-often permanently.22
The issues of crime and punishment have also affected the operation
of government by transforming state budgets.2 Policy issues are more
likely to be funded if they fit the model of crime-that is, if they can be
seen as the result of blameworthy behavior by responsible individuals
whose identification and punishment can be plausibly thought to deter
others.
Finally, fear of crime, much of it created by the political process it-
self,24 is affecting government because it has reconfigured the way that
middle- and upper-class Americans have chosen to locate themselves
geographically and institutionally. In the 1960s and 1970s, large numbers
of middle-class families simply fled over city limits to escape crime, but,
in recent years, even these suburbs have been hollowed out by a flight to
more remote settings and a distancing from community life in the name
of security.2 Because municipal boundaries create distinct political com-
munities over broad and essential aspects of life-including schools, resi-
dential price and availability, and jobs-efforts by Americans to segre-
gate themselves from the poor and minorities have proven all too
20. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995, tbl.6.2.
21. See JEROME MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (1996). These figures would almost certainly be higher today.
22. See JAMIE FELNER & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT & HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 7-8 (1998).
23. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 47-48; Dan Pens, The California Prison Guards Union: A Potent
Political Action Group, in THE CELLING OF AMERICA: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE U.S. PRISON
INDUSTRY 134-35 (Daniel Burton-Rose ed., 1998).
24. BECKETT, supra note 6, at 15, argues primarily that the public's view that priority
should be given to ameliorating problems such as crime and drug use increased after political
mobilization around the crime issue.
25. See MIKE DAVIS, ECOLOGY OF FEAR: LOS ANGELES AND THE IMAGINATION OF
DISASTER 398-402 (1998).
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successful. Without the binding influences that come from common po-
litical and social forums, the politics of exclusion and demonization pros-
per.
Few authors are in as good a position to reflect on this watershed
change in American politics as Susan Estrich, the Robert Kingsley Pro-
fessor of Law and Political Science at the University of Southern Califor-
nia. Estrich has been an advisor to every Democratic presidential candi-
date since 1984. She also managed Michael Dukakis's 1988 presidential
campaign. Today she is a leading commentator on legal and political af-
fairs in the national media spotlight. Moreover, Estrich has been an in-
fluential legal scholar whose research has consistently leaped beyond the
library abstractions of traditional doctrinal analysis. Her 1986 article on
rape and the social assumptions that guide prosecutorial and jury think-
ing about it opened with an unforgettable recounting of her own experi-
ence as a victim of violent crime.26 Ultimately, the article helped trans-
form the treatment of rape in criminal law courses.
Estrich's latest publication, Getting away with Murder, sounds like
another book about the O.J. Simpson case, or a hatchet-in-hand polemic
about lying lawyers and inept bureaucracies like the one published by the
late New York trial judge Harold Rothwax.27 It is not, however. Estrich
does believe that the Simpson trial reflected a lot more about what is
generally wrong with American criminal justice than is commonly ac-
knowledged, but her reflections do not dwell on the media-saturated
Simpson case. Rather, readers will find themselves learning far more
about contemporary controversies in criminal law doctrine than the stan-
dard fare of celebrity cases embodies.
At first glance, it is somewhat difficult to discern the overall structure
of Estrich's reflections, which move from defenses based on the subju-
gated positions occupied by women and ethnic minorities, to racism in
the criminal justice system, to the politics of punishment and the honesty
of lawyers. At times the book reads like the intellectual diary of a person
deeply involved in teaching and commenting on crime and politics.
Through the use of this eclectic and informal approach, Estrich gives the
reader a sampling of the issues that concern her as a teacher and activist
rather than a theoretical explication of these issues. This unique and ad-
mirably straightforward approach allows the reader to acquire a broad
understanding of Estrich's views. Taken as a whole, the book seems to
reflect a larger project-one of recasting and reaffirming a liberal ap-
26. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087-88 (1986); see also SUSAN ESTRICH,
REAL RAPE 1-4 (1987).
27. See HERALD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1996)
(arguing that criminal justice has been undermined by manipulative defense tactics).
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proach to criminal justice. One hopes the book will develop into a con-
comitantly larger work.
In this review, I will concentrate on Estrich's defense of contempo-
rary liberal legalism. In the two most substantial sections of her book,
Estrich addresses two major threats to her position-one commonly as-
sociated with the political left and one associated with the right. On the
left, liberal legal theory finds its doctrinal structures, including the Model
Penal Code and the United States Sentencing Guidelines, under pressure
from proponents of identity politics and those who demand recognition
of subjective positionality in the administration of justice. On the right,
liberal legal theory finds itself menaced by a diffuse populist punitiveness
that tends to identify with crime victims and demand retributive justice.
The "tight place" of my title comes from a famous passage of Psalms?
that is often included in Jewish Sabbath and holiday meditations. The
passage is usually translated as follows: "In distress, I called on the Lord;
the Lord answered me from a wide space."29 The central Hebrew term
"Hametzar" invokes two meanings, bodily affliction and spatial constric-
tion. In my title, I mean to emphasize the spatial image, although distress
is implied as well. Liberalism is in a "tight place," caught between crime
and race. To survive, it must escape to a wider space where its traditional
politics of coalition can thrive. Estrich recognizes this distress and at-
tepmts to direct liberals toward a broader vision of politics and law.
In the remaining sections of this review, I will argue that Estrich's vi-
sion is not yet broad enough to allow real revitalization of liberal legal-
ism. The following section examines Estrich's defense of a common stan-
dard of reasonableness, a term at the core of many important defenses,
especially defenses to violent crimes. The review will then examine
Estrich's effort to re-imagine a liberal embrace of punitive justice.
II. THE REASONABLE PERSON IN A POST-MODERN AGE
The book's subtitle warns that "politics is destroying the criminal jus-
tice system," but Estrich has neither an expos6 to offer nor an axe to
grind against an overarching conspiracy. Rather, she seems to express the
sentiment that, if politics threaten American criminal justice, it is because
our country's politics are fundamentally fragmented and inconsistent.
Despite this, Estrich does not argue for an idealized state of law that ex-
ists at a remove from politics. Rather, she suggests that, if it once seemed
28. Psalms 118:5.
29. KOL HANESHAM: SHABBAT VEHAGIM 372 (2d ed. 1995). The full transliteration of the
passage is "Min hametzar karati yah anani vamerhav yah. Adonay li lo ira ma ya'aseh li adam."
This is translated as: "From my distress, I cried out: 'Yal!' / Yah answered, bringing great re-
lease."
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like law was law, and politics was politics, it was because both responded
to a relatively narrow band of opinion. "If the 1950s were a time of
greater clarity in the law, it is not because politics was missing but be-
cause the homogeneity of the system made consensus look and feel like
something other than a political decision.,
3
1
Since publishing her law review article on rape,31 Estrich has been en-
gaged in criticizing the limits on social knowledge incorporated in crimi-
nal law doctrine that have resulted from the longstanding exclusion of
women and minorities. But in so doing, she has sought to preserve and
build on the advances of modem criminal law theory, especially those as-
sociated with the Model Penal Code ("MPC"), rather than destroying the
preexisting structure in its entirety.
One of the distinctive features of the MPC is its heavy reliance on
jury evaluations of the "reasonableness" of the actor's conduct as an al-
ternative to bright-line rules based on specific objective factors. Estrich
endorses "reasonableness" as a way of producing political compromise in
American criminal law.32 Interestingly, in Getting away with Murder,
Estrich is troubled most not by the arguments of conservative defenders
of the traditional white male standard of reasonableness but rather by
the suggestions of fellow advocates for the excluded who would prefer to
substitute for the common reasonableness standard specific standards
tied to the subjective position of the accused.
Estrich defends reasonableness in a two-pronged argument. First,
Estrich rejects "the modern political attack on... the reasonable man as
being racist and sexist, Western and white. 33 Rather, she argues, reason-
ableness standards are capable of being as open as the politics that sur-
round them. Second, Estrich fears the political and legal results of a sys-
tem that addresses the traditional narrowness of the reasonable man
standard by creating wholly distinct standards for specific categories of
disadvantaged groups. Deprived of the opportunity to use the criminal
law to set community-wide standards, she argues, juries and the public-
at-large might respond by becoming even more paranoid and hostile
"beyond the jury room."35
While expressing the belief that the right level of individualization in
applying reasonableness standards can be found, Estrich does not suggest
that this is an easy feat. Its difficulty is exemplified for Estrich by the
30. ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 19.
31. Estrich, supra note 26.
32. See ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 18.
33. Id. at 23.
34. See id. at 37.
35. Id.
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problem of battered women as criminal defendants. The issue has re-
ceived considerable attention from legal scholars since the decision of
State v. Wanrow, 6 a prosecution brought in Washington in the late 1970s.
Avena Wanrow, a Native-American woman, was convicted of murder
for the shooting death of a man she had accused of attempting to sexually
abuse her child. On appeal, Wanrow's attorneys argued that she should
have been allowed to introduce evidence bearing upon how her status as
a woman and a minority influenced her perception of the threat she
faced when she committed the murder. Additionally, Wanrow's lawyers
argued that the jury instructions on reasonableness failed to correct the
statute's implication that reasonableness was to be measured by a mas-
culine standard.
Ultimately, the Washington Supreme Court overturned Wanrow's
conviction, holding that the jury instructions created the impression that
"'the objective standard to be applied is that applicable to an altercation
between two men."'37 Instead, according to the court, "self defense in-
structions [must] afford women the right to have their conduct judged in
light of... individual physical handicaps which are the product of sex
discrimination."3 Estrich agrees with this decision, arguing that it repre-
sents an effort to make the reasonableness standard more inclusive, but
she rejects efforts that have been mounted since Wanrow to establish a
series of specific reasonableness standards for defendants with particular
identities.39
For Estrich, the use of expert testimony to bolster the credibility of
defendants' stories-especially when those stories are likely to be less
visible and familiar to juries because of sexism and racism-is not a
problem. Estrich becomes concerned, however, when juries are invited to
apply a wholly specific standard applicable to particular categories of
people or individuals. Once courts start down that path, Estrich fears, it
will become too easy for virtually all criminals to show they were acting
reasonably based on their own unique developmental circumstances.40
Moreover, Estrich is concerned that this approach will endanger
women's efforts to defeat stereotypes that have been produced as a by-
41product of their oppression.
Estrich draws an interesting analogy between specific reasonableness
standards and the development of the insanity defense in the 1950s, when
36. 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977).
37. See ESTRICH supra note 15, at 25 (quoting Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 558).
38. Id.
39. See id. at 26-27.
40. See id. at 33-34.
41. See id. at 27.
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the standard for mental illness was redefined to allow it to fit the specific
experience of defendants-an approach embodied by the well-known
Durham rule. 2 Estrich notes that it has always been difficult to determine
whether these reformed standards made any real difference,43 but the
perception that they were depriving juries of the opportunity to apply a
community standard of blameworthiness has clearly led to a backlash in
which the law has largely returned to its most traditional posture.
44
While Durham-type reforms were largely the result of white male
lawyers advocating for white male defendants, Estrich clearly believes
that their long term results should serve as a warning to advocates for
women and minorities. Specifically, these advocates should be aware that
particularized identity-based standards may be no more likely to produce
victories for defendants, because juries must still "apply" them and are
quite likely to rebel against efforts to expand reasonableness.
Estrich advocates the implementation of the "reasonable person"
standard: "[n]ot the lowest common denominator, which allows everyone
to get away with murder, and not the 1950s white-male standard either,
but the product of an inclusive process that seeks to define and enforce
common ground." 45 She argues that, when this standard works well, juries
will consider the background of defendants like Avena Wanrow in
evaluating the circumstances that surrounded the choice to kill, but,
having done so, they will revert to the standard of common reasonable-
ness in applying the law. At this stage, Estrich suggests, cases will-and
should-often turn on the credibility of actors rather than on the identi-
ties of these individuals. In summary, Estrich challenges her readers to
"imagine a process, an inclusive and representative process, in which
Americans of diverse backgrounds and beliefs could come together and
decide that some battered wives are acting reasonably and some aren't."
46
Ultimately, she argues, juries could become places where we find our
common ground and enforce it rather than heading to our separate
camps.
Estrich's picture is attractive. Juries are one of the rare political insti-
tutions that allow for direct participation in government. Like their close
cousin the militia, juries loomed far larger in the landscape of the late
eighteenth century than the late twentieth.47 Estrich is not alone her be-
42. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
43. See ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 30.
44. JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 749-53 (3d ed. 1996)
(discussing the trend toward tightening the insanity defense).
45. See ESTRiCH, supra note 15, at 36.
46. Id. at 37:
47. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 161-78 (1997).
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lief that a renewal of the jury could be a good thing.4 Others seem to
share the hope that the jury could become a forum for building trust and
confidence among members of increasingly diverse communities in their
collective ability to make judgments.
It is easy to share Estrich's desire for an improved system. It is not
certain, however, how well reasonableness as a political compromise
works in general. The Model Penal Code, like much of modem criminal
jurisprudence, relies heavily on jury evaluations of the mental state of the
offender to distribute blame and punishment. In so doing, the Code re-
jects earlier common law traditions that relied on objective features of
conduct and circumstance to delimit culpability.49 In a sense these tradi-
tional approaches, which prevailed until the late 1950s, reflected a
uniquely twentieth-century optimism about our ability to understand the
mental states of others and find a common ground missing in social and
cultural life.0
Cases with defendants who bring obscure cultural backgrounds to
court underscore the law's dependence on shared norms. How is a Cali-
fornia jury to evaluate whether abandonment by a husband is sufficient
provocation to mitigate a Chinese woman's murder of their infant son?"'
It is also important to realize, however, that such cases are quite rare and
that focusing exclusively upon them may actually distract us from ad-
dressing the pressing question of how well juries can operationalize legal
standards when confronting more pedestrian facts and more familiar
neighbors.
The historic trend in Anglo-American jurisprudence toward granting
juries a greater role in assessing the evidence places more and more
weight on the ability of the jury to sort through contradictory evidence,
including contests of testimony between witnesses.2 But the incredibly
dispersed experiences of life in late twentieth-century America under-
48. See ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 55-56; see also AMAR, supra note 47.
49. For example, in the law of attempts, the Model Penal Code rejected a long list of tradi-
tional objective tests of when progress toward a crime had gone far enough to be punishable
with a strong emphasis on intent. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 796-97.
50. See generally PSYCHOLOGICAL MAN (Robert Boyers ed., 1975) (reviewing the intellec-
tual developments supporting this 20th-century notion); NIKOLAS ROSE, INVENTING OUR
SELVES: PSYCHOLOGY, POWER, AND PERSONHOOD (1996) (analyzing the centrality of psy-
chology to liberal governance). The priority of the subject has even deeper roots in the western
philosophical tradition. See HUBERT L. DREYFUs, WHAT COMPUTERS CAN'T Do: THE LIMITS
OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 235 (2d ed. 1979) (analyzing the western tendency to privilege
cognition over the body as the source of validation for knowledge and the relationship of this
tradition to contemporary artificial intelligence research).
51. See, e.g., People v. Wu, 235 Cal. App. 3d 614 (1991).
52. See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as a Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575 (1997)
(discussing the long-term reduction in limitations on the jury's ability to hear and interpret con-
flicting sworn testimony).
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mine our confidence in the ability of jurors to fulfill this task. The prob-
lem is not simply one of unfamiliarity; it arises from the very diffusion of
agency and its connection with mental life in a postmodern world that
seems to be losing many of the institutions and experiences the grounded
the earlier optimism of psychological unity. The question for an increas-
ingly postmodern society may be whether such a mentally oriented jus-
tice system can work to legitimate an increasingly distended punishment
system. 3
Against this challenge, the emphasis of modem criminal law on al-
lowing the jury to use mental-state conditions to forge acceptable com-
promises may only hide the problem. Consider, for example, common
law theories of accomplice liability. These limited the set of actors who
could receive the heaviest punishments for a crime by employing objec-
tive features of conduct such as presence at the scene and the level of
objective assistance provided.5 Modern approaches, including the Model
Penal Code, have rejected such constructs in favor of an emphasis on the
mental state of the defendant-primarily on whether he intended to aid
the crime."
The modem shift in criminal law toward a greater role for mental
state undoubtedly reflects the sense that reliance on conduct elements
was being undermined by modernization and its attendant break down of
traditional practices in our society. Modernists tried to solve this problem
by viewing mental life as a place to anchor criminal culpability, but post-
modem conditions, including globalization, the passing of the industrial
economy and the urban society it has sustained, and the enormous ex-
pansion of communication technology, undermine the capacity of the
jury-at least as currently composed and organized-to have much reli-
ability and consistency in rendering judgment. 6 The problem is not
whether juries can sufficiently identify with defendants seen as "other"
because of differences in race, nationality, or culture but whether the
dominant cultural narratives are coherent enough to permit effective
judgment even of more sympathetic defendants.
Two approaches offer themselves for those who are concerned that
substantive injustices arising from such incoherency may ultimately un-
53. The literature on postmodernization is now vast. See, e.g., ULRICH BECK, THE RISK
SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter trans., 1992); DONNA HARAWAY,
SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE (1991); FREDERIC
JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM: THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991).
54. See KAPLAN ETAL., supra note 44, at 859-63 (discussing modem accomplice liability).
55. See id.
56. See generally BECK, supra note 53; HARAWAY, supra note 53; DAVID HARVEY, THE
CONDITION OF POSTMODERNrry: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE
(1989).
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dermine the legitimacy of criminal law. First, in opposition to the trend of
modem criminal law that Estrich defends, we may need to inject new
objective conduct elements into the definitions of substantive crimes.
Victoria Nourse has argued, for example, that the modem trend in the
law of homicide toward allowing the jury to consider provocation man-
slaughter without much judicial limitation allows men who kill women in
an effort to enforce male domination to avoid the harshest punishments."
Nourse argues for limiting manslaughter defenses to "warranted ex-
cuses," that is, to those cases where the passion that led to the crime was
an emotional response paralleling the law's own response to the victim's
conduct.58
Second, if we intend to continue to rely on juries to sort out mental
states, we should limit the reach of the law to conduct that by broad con-
sensus is threatening enough to social order to justify the risk of heavy
punishment. Punishments for most drug crimes, for example, should be
aimed at ameliorating the harm to both addicts and communities. 9 The
most destructive sanctions, like prison, should be limited to those whose
willingness to use violence and degree of profit require the strongest de-
terrents.6°
III. RACE, CRIME, AND AMERICAN LIBERALISM
In her experience as Michael Dukakis's campaign manager, Estrich
saw firsthand the devastating effects the crime issue can have on a candi-
date who cannot provide a sufficiently enthusiastic response to the in-
creasing popular demand for harsh punishment. Dukakis was defeated,
in large part, because of the public's perception that he was overly solici-
tous of dangerous criminals like Willie Horton and unwilling to support
severe punishments, especially the death penalty.
61
Why are liberals so disabled by the crime issue? The answer is no
doubt complicated, but Estrich cuts to its core by focusing on racism.
Liberals have resisted calls for toughness in punishment for at least two
reasons, both grounded in their experience with the race question. First,
57. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation De-
fense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997).
58. See id. at 1392-94. She draws on law itself to provide this objectivity by suggesting that a
killing motivated by unlawful aims should be proscribed.
59. See, e.g., THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 201-04 (presenting such a pro-
posal).
60. The German constitutional court has taken a similar position on drugs. See German
Court Refuses To Allow Prosecution of Marijuana Offenses, 3 DRUG L. REP. 140 (1994).
61. It is now conventional wisdom that, when Governor Dukakis declined a reporter's invi-
tation to admit that he would want capital punishment for someone who had raped and mur-
dered his wife, he crystalized the view that he did not share the values of ordinary Americans.
See WATrENBERG, supra note 5, at 42.
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liberals fear that the criminal justice system produces results that con-
tinue to reflect the systematic racism that was an undeniable feature of
American criminal justice at least through the 1970s.62 Second, liberals
have been concerned that tough penalties do not adequately reflect the
social responsibility that the American government has for the powerful
criminogenic forces that surround most children born into urban zones of
hardened poverty.6'
Given the centrality of crime to American voters and their use of
tough punishment as a measure of political integrity, liberals have found
themselves in an increasingly tight place. Their commitment to undoing
the effects of racism has made them reluctant to address crime and em-
brace punishment for lawbreakers. In contrast, conservatives like Ronald
Reagan could express open-throated outrage about crime, unhampered
by any fears of a resurgent use of penal justice to achieve racial domina-
tion. '
Estrich clearly sees her mission as liberating liberals from this painful
and politically self-destructive bind. As early as 1980, in her work as a
staff attorney on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Estrich wanted to
move crime to the center of the party's domestic program, a thought that
horrified fellow liberal staffers. In Getting away with Murder, Estrich re-
flects on one such conversation. "You want us to take the lead in locking
up black men he asked me.... Yes. White people too. If they're rapists
and killers. Help the victims, not the bad guys." 5
The development of her thinking on this topic seems to have been
catalyzed by a discussion with Bill Clinton. Estrich recalls a Clinton visit
to the Dukakis debate preparations in 1988:
[A]fter a long and frustrating session of Willie-Horton/pledge of alle-
giance/ACLU/death-penalty questions, the future President explained crime
politics to me. He took out a piece of paper, and on one side listed the
Democratic governors who were for the death penalty, and on the other
those who were against. It was a breakdown between the past and the fu-
ture.
Clinton is an intriguing example. More than any other President since
Lyndon Johnson, Clinton has made his relationship to the race issue a
constitutive issue of his presidency. At the same time, he has been un-
compromising in pushing a punitive "tough on crime" position, including
62. See ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 68.
63. See id. at 67.
64. This fact reflected what can most charitably be called Reagan's "active ignorance" of
the reality of American racism.
65. ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 68.
66. Id. at 69.
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support for the death penalty and the hiring of more police. 67 But like so
much else about his presidency, it is difficult to tell with Clinton where
postmodern pastiche ends and the real reconciliation of opposing values
begins. Ultimately, his policies tend to reconcile these antinomies with a
balance of gestures 6 rather than workable solutions.
Estrich suggests that the Clinton position has proved politically effec-
tive, but only at the cost of making the whole debate about crime less
honest.69 It is difficult to discern, however, whether she has made more
substantive progress in reconciling the anti-racist values of liberals with
the need to address the crime fears and angers of ordinary Americans.
Estrich unabashedly embraces the anger of ordinary Americans to-
ward specific types of crime-crimes against persons and personal prop-
erty-that they fear most. She also embraces the demand for harsh pun-
ishments against those who conunit such crimes while demanding that
such harshness be channeled into rational strategies that maximize the
crime control bang for taxpayers' retributive bucks. These strategies in-
clude better use of policing, more selectivity in the use of long prison sen-
tences, and even attention to the external sources of crime, especially in
the realm of schools, families, and communities.
Estrich's vision for a liberal posture on crime policy is thus two-fold.
First, Estrich argues that liberals must embrace severe punishment in the
name of victims, without reservations based on the fear of racism haunt-
ing the criminal justice system. The second, less developed argument calls
for "smart" punishment that will maximize the crime control value of the
punishment we do use. Among other things, Estrich argues that liberals
should tap into their special sensitivity toward race issues to develop
more effective and less damaging crime control strategies.
The first suggestion has immense political appeal given current elec-
toral conditions, but it subordinates the problem of racism in a manner
that should trouble liberals. Additionally, it promotes a solidarity based
on fear of crime victimization, the political results of which are difficult at
best to predict. Although politically attractive, Estrich's proposed strat-
egy represents a dangerous surrender of principle that could, in the long
run, return to haunt liberals whose most precious legacy from the twenti-
eth century is their correct insistence that solving America's heritage of
racism receive priority treatment from government.
67. See Chernoff, supra note 4, at 543.
68. Both Chernoff and Wattenberg take Clinton to task for failing to follow through on the
crime issue, see WATENBERG, supra note 5; Chernoff, supra note 4, others have been equally
disappointed by his civil rights efforts.
69. See ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 65.
Vol. 17:853, 1999
Crime, Punishment, and American Liberalism
The appeal to smart punishment that is research-based and results-
oriented is more promising, but unfortunately Estrich remains wedded to
one early example, Rand's selective incapacitation proposal from the
early 1980s.70 The Rand proposal, if implemented, directly threatens to
exacerbate the racial effects of punishment. This difficulty noted, how-
ever, I believe Estrich's second strategy, with modification, may prove to
be sound.
A. Embracing the War on Crime
While acknowledging the increasing overrepresentation of African-
Americans in the correctional population7 1 Estrich rejects the view that
the criminal justice system in general, or the war on drugs specifically, is a
reflection of enduring racism. Like most criminologists, Estrich points to
the strong correlation between the rate of incarceration and the rate of
offending as reported both in police reports and victim survey data.
72
From this perspective, the incredibly high rates of involvement of Afri-
can-American males in every stage of the criminal justice system reflect a
very real difference in the prevalence of criminal offending.
What the police are doing in stopping black men, what I am doing in hesi-
tating to get on the elevator, what many of us, Jesse Jackson included, do
when we cross the street to avoid a black man, is not wrong in a statistical
sense. Of course a majority of black men aren't criminals, but that's not the
question. Is the risk big enough to make it worthwhile to take precautions?
73
Estrich rightly points out that this correlation hardly dismisses the
larger social justice question of why so many young African-Americans
are seemingly fated for a life of crime and punishment.7 4 Like other liber-
als, most notably William Julius Wilson 5 Estrich espouses the view that
high rates of crime among African-Americans reflect the predictable
outcome of social and economic policies that have produced an under-
class whose dismal decline has balanced the rise of a black middle-class.76
Estrich, however, argues that if racism and its residues are a source of
these high crime rates, this is very different than racism within the crimi-
nal justice system. Estrich seems to believe that a liberalism that recog-
70. See id. at 89-90.
71. See id. at 47.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 51.
74. See id. at 48.
75. See VILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WoRK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR (1996).
76. See ESTICI-, supra note 15, at 48.
77. See id.
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nizes that distinction can confidently take up the cause of fighting crime
along with its traditional goals of fighting racism and inequality.
Estrich's strongest argument is that liberals' concern for racial minori-
ties should lead them to identify primarily with minority victims of crime
rather than with minority victims of discrimination in the criminal justice
system.7s It is undeniable that the excess incidence of crime, especially
violent crime among black males, primarily affects poor minority com-
munities.79 Liberals who only see the civil rights issue of discriminatory
treatment of minorities in arrests, prosecutions, and punishment fail to
consider the plight of the law-abiding majority in such communities.
Estrich's position is not entirely satisfying for two reasons. First, an-
nouncing empathy with African-American victims of crime remains an
empty gesture unless it is followed by genuine consideration of whether
the punitive crime control approaches so widely supported by politicians
targeting white suburban voters actually address the concerns and view-
points of African-Americans living in communities adversely affected by
increasing crime rates.
The answer to this unasked question is not clear. For instance, in her
recent work on this topic, Professor Tracey Meares has suggested that
the structural problems of inner-city communities may indeed have law
enforcement solutions but that heavy and indiscriminate use of impris-
onment is actually counter-productive.80 Specifically, she argues that ad-
dressing crime by indiscriminately removing law-breakers from the
community may do more to undermine informal social controls than to
bolster them.8' Lengthy imprisonment of mature males involved in low-
level drug trafficking may denude a community of fathers and older
brothers to police younger males and discourage violent conflict among
juveniles. s Meares argues that many inner-city residents want law en-
forcement not to withdraw but instead to be reoriented toward actions
that will bolster the community's own capacity for social control. Such
strategies might include targeting buyers-often suburban whites-rather
than low-level dealers-often minorities from the inner-city-for arrest
and introducing curfews and anti-loitering laws designed to disrupt be-
havioral patterns that lead to crime."
78. See id.
79. See id. The same route is taken by Professor Randall Kennedy in his insightful book on
race and crime. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 345 (1997).
80. See Tracey Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669 (1998).
81. See id. at 683; see also Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith. The Tragedy of Race, Crime,
and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1270, 1280-81 (1998) (reviewing KENNEDY, supra note 79).
82. See Butler, supra note 81, at 1280-81.
83. See Meares, supra note 80, at 697-99.
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Estrich's suggestion is also problematic because the massive effects of
criminalization on the minority community cannot be justified solely by
identifying with the situation of minority victims. The crime that is re-
sponsible for the largest part of the increase in African-American incar-
ceration, drug trafficking, does not easily fit the victimization model. In-
sofar as trafficking brings income into impoverished communities, its
affects on these communities may well be mixed if not downright benefi-
cial.8'
In the absence of a more convincing analysis of black victimization
and its relationship to the punishment boom, Estrich's argument serves
only to leap over the question of race. From the victim's perspective, the
need for punishment cannot be diminished even by the reality of a racist
society. Estrich herself displays the tendency toward this view, drawing
on her own experience of violent victimization to argue that race simply
does not matter when it comes to punishing the guilty. She comments
that, "[t]he man who raped me when I was 21 deserved to be punished
without regard to race or racism. Whatever else happened to him in his
life, he was still responsible for what he did to me. That much, at least, I
always knew." 5
Victimization produces an imperative for governmental action that
has its own moral authority and trumps the issue of racism, in part, be-
cause the claims of victims resonate across the divisions of race.86 Never-
theless, Estrich fails to address adequately the potentially negative rami-
fications of employing such a strategy in addressing the crime problem.
Rather, in Getting away with Murder, the reader gets the sense that re-
cent years have given Estrich a new purchase on the political meaning of
victimization and the empowerment that it provides. She never addresses
this directly, but it comes through most clearly in her meditations on the
darkest comer of the race, crime, and punishment problem-the death
penalty.
84. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 698 (1995). But see KENNEDY, supra note 79, at 375-76.
85. ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 68.
86. It is precisely the apparent denial of this idea by juries in the trial for the attempted
murder of Damian Williams and the murder trial of O.J. Simpson, both in L.A., that outraged
many white commentators. See ESTRIcH, supra note 15, at 42. But it is far from clear that this is
the best way to read those verdicts. In both cases, the moral claims of victims were deflected by
defense lawyers who deftly invoked the specter of police racism-greatly aided, of course, by
the reputation and conduct of the LAPD. Likewise, the largely white jury in Simi Valley, Cali-
fornia, which acquitted the four Los Angeles police officers showed not that they approved of
vicious gang-style assaults but that, once framed as a battle between law enforcement and a pa-
rolee willing to lead the police on a highway chase, the violence was perceived as justified. As
Estrich demonstrates in chapter one, however, the capacity to evaluate violent conduct as some-
thing other than blameworthy is one of the central features of the body of criminal law inherited
from the common law. See id. at 9-14. Violent assaults leading to possible death are the acts
most likely to be viewed sympathetically.
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In McCleskey v. Kemp,87 the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's death
penalty against a statistical demonstration that, all other things being
equal, killers of white victims were significantly more likely to receive the
death penalty than black victims. For many liberals, McCleskey is em-
blematic of the current Court's willingness to abandon the pursuit of
equal protection for racial minorities. Yet, in a stunning admission,
Estrich joins the McCleskey majority in rejecting the statistical argument
as a reason for halting executions. She notes, "[t]hat argument failed to
persuade a majority of the Supreme Court, not to mention most Ameri-
cans. It doesn't even persuade me anymore. Why should statistical under-
valuation of the lives of black victims provide the grounds for reversal in
the case of an unquestionably guilty and brutal killer?""
It is tempting to follow Estrich out of the tight place of crime and race
that liberalism finds itself in. Upon closer examination, however, it be-
comes apparent that Estrich fares no better than Clinton in her ability to
offer the liberals an ethical vision of how to make this strategy anything
other than a politically expeditious move. Like President Clinton, Estrich
finesses the tight place of race and crime through a genuine empathy with
crime victims and a readiness to claim the moral authority that victimiza-
tion provides for governing. Relying on the moral force of victimization,
however, leads to two problems. First, it denies the independent force of
our constitutional commitment to eradicate vestiges of racism in our cul-
ture. Second, by valorizing the victims of crime not just as an objects of
sympathy but as a source of political power, it promises electoral success
for liberals without commensurate governmental success.
Choosing to prioritize crime victims over victims of racism should be
rejected on the grounds that liberals are right to see governmental re-
sponsibility for overcoming racism as fundamental. Government, after
all, bears the responsibility for having institutionalized and enforced ra-
cism for most the United States' history. By contrast, while our govern-
ment's failure to prevent crimes is regrettable, crime is not a product of
government action. Rather than allowing empathy with victims to under-
cut the government's responsibility for combating racism, the imperative
of overcoming racism should set limits on our efforts to punish offenders
when the two values conflict.
Consider, for example, the case of the death penalty. It may be true
that McCleskey was a deserving candidate for the death penalty in Geor-
gia and many other states because he deliberately killed a police officer
87. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
88. ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 68 (emphasis added).
89. See generally DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed.
1980) (summarizing the role of government in constructing American racial order).
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in the perpetration of another serious felony. But McCleskey's lawyers
presented unrefuted evidence that the apparatus of capital punishment
decisionmaking in Georgia was infected with racial social meanings-
racial solidarity for whites and animus toward blacks. 90
To permit a state that has in the past quite openly discriminated on
the basis of race to utilize a penal sanction peculiarly associated with ra-
cism-in a manner that, as objectively measured, still remains racially
marked-is to recognize the hollowness of the underlying right to equal
protection.9' Since Georgia can effectuate most if not all of its retributive,
incapacitative, and deterrent goals by sentencing Warren McCleskey and
similar killers to lifelong imprisonment, it is quite unlike situations in
which fear of the racist influence on law enforcement practices tempts us
to forego any punishment of particular offenders.9 The death penalty is a
practice that can be justified, if at all, because of its social meaning.93 In
the face of strong evidence that the social meaning of executions in
Georgia remains strongly racially demarcated, permitting execution in
this state can only reflect a willingness to ignore the implications of his-
toric racism.
Liberals can and should promote responses to victimization that do
not exacerbate existing problems of racism. For example, serious efforts
to provide resources to compensate and restore victims of crime do not
run the risk of reinforcing racially identified punishments. 94 Indeed, inso-
far as a disproportionate number of crime victims are racial minorities, a
well-funded victim compensation scheme would promote both the goals
of overcoming racism and helping crime victims. Likewise, serious efforts
to empower communities to prevent crime by bolstering community insti-
tutions can promote crime reduction and help to overcome the historic
consequences of racism.95
Finally, even if liberals were to believe that the criminal process was
free of racial invidiousness, they should hesitate before embracing vic-
timization as a central source of legitimization for government. Whereas
90. The Baldus study showed that, controlling for numerous relevant variables, both the
race of the victim and the race of the offender had a statistically significant effect on death sen-
tences; combining a white victim with black killer was shown to produce the greatest likelihood
that the defendant would be given the death penalty. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87.
91. See KENNEDY, supra note 79, at 340-41.
92. Such situations might evoke support for the exclusionary rule because of fear that
Fourth Amendment violations will disproportionately befall minorities. See, e.g., David A.
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP.
Cr. REV. 271,328.
93. See Larry Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CM. L. REV. 943 (1995).
94. See generally OFFICE FOR VICrIMs OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FROM PAIN TO
POWER: CRIME VIcrIs TAKE ACTION (1998).
95. See Meares, supra note 80, at 694-705 (suggesting ways of reorienting law enforcement
to empower poor communities).
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the experience of victimization and the fear of it provide a moral source
of authority for power, it is not clear that victimization provides a suit-
able practical base for authority, at least not the more activist govern-
ment that liberals like Estrich would normally seek. The problem is not
one of dividing people. In fact, outrage over what happens to victims of
violent crime crosses all communities. It might indeed form a basis for
widespread coalitions of the sort that have recently slipped away from
liberals who once wielded them effectively on issues like education. The
problem is the kind of governing for which such a coalition can deliver a
mandate.
Political theorist Wendy Brown has recently offered a critique of the
victim-centered politics pursued by many feminists and anti-racists. 96 She
argues that the satisfaction that comes from avenging oppression carries
the price of reinforcing the very categories of the original victimization. It
also tends to reconfigure relationships so that law and the state become
inevitable intermediaries. Additionally, a politics of crime victimization
will tend to make the experience of victimization and its mentalities of
humiliation and revenge into a framework for governing, for, when peo-
ple are brought together out of their shared outrage at victimization, it is
to concerns of security and vengeance that they are most likely to turn.
B. Smarter Crime Control
Estrich is at her most persuasive when she suggests that "it is not the
disproportionate impact of punishment that makes the system racist but
the disproportionate impact of our failures at prevention.... "9 Crime
prevention advocates like to note that it takes three elements to produce
a crime: a motivated offender, a vulnerable victim, and a time and place
that brings them together and makes the crime possible.9" Crime policy,
both liberal and conservative, overwhelmingly focuses on the offender-
whether to punish or rehabilitate. 9 In recent years, criminologists and
policy experts have begun to turn to the other possibilities for interven-
tion suggested by the other elements of crime."' Unfortunately, despite
acknowledging that the people may support prevention more than politi-
cians do,'0 ' Estrich does not adequately address the question of how the
96. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF FREEDOM: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY 27 (1995).
97. ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 92.
98. See Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, in BUILDING A SAFER SOCIETY:




101. See ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 89.
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concerns of both crime victims and the general public might be addressed
by crime prevention measures. Rather, her view of smart crime control is
smarter use of punishment.
Estrich offers a strong critique of our current reliance on the strategy
of imprisoning as many offenders as possible and the use of devices such
mandatory sentences designed to effectuate this goal."O' Clearly, the cost
of this strategy, in human terms, is staggering. The Department of Justice
calculated that if the 1991 incarceration rates continued unchanged, a
black male in the United States would have greater than a one-in-four
chance of spending some time in prison.'3 If imprisonment were the only
sensible way to combat serious crime, this consequence might be accept-
able to Estrich (in light of the moral priority that she assigns to crime vic-
tims). Imprisonment, however, is not the only sensible way to combat
crime.
Like many criminologists but few politicians, Estrich believes that
general use of long prison terms for incapacitation is a bad deal on crime
control.'O° She acknowledges that keeping a person in prison clearly pre-
vents him or her from committing crimes in the community while con-
fined. Furthermore, assuming that these individuals do not accelerate of-
fending after their release and that imprisonment costs are less than the
costs of the crimes avoided, time in prison is a net gain for crime control.
She emphasizes, however, that this conclusion is unfounded, if im-
prisonment does accelerate the criminality of enough prisoners or the
pattern of future offending is driven by predictable factors independent
of imprisonment-factors that have been proven to operate. In reality,
crime rates tend to peak in the late teenage years and diminish greatly
across the adult life span.'Y5 Thus, by the time an offender is facing a long
prison term after accumulating a few convictions, he is likely to be near
the end of his criminally productive years. Consequently, we may be
locking people up for long terms precisely at the point where the costs of
imprisonment are likely to quickly outstrip the savings on crimes pre-
vented. Because of this, currently popular laws like "three-strikes" legis-
lation actually exacerbate the problem by throwing very long and inflexi-
ble sentences at offenders who will typically be on the mature side of the
age curve.106
102. See id. at 82-86.
103. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LIFETIME
LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON 1 (1997).
104. See ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 82.
105. See ROBERT SAMPSON & JOHN LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND
TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 6 (1993).
106. See ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 75-76.
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The problems with generalized incapacitation through imprisonment
lead Estrich to endorse a strategy that focuses on incapacitating the most
dangerous offenders, both those who commit violent crimes and those
who commit serious crimes at a very high rate.'Y In the early 1980s, Pro-
fessor Estrich joined with a group of scholars from Harvard's Kennedy
School to publish a book endorsing a selective incapacitation approach
for sentencing robbers and burglars. The approach was showcased in
1982 by the publication of a Rand Corporation study that used inmate
self-report data to develop a predictive scale capable of identifying high-
rate offenders with efficiency.
The Rand system included seven factors that Professor Estrich re-
prints in full, describing them as unsurprising:
(1) prior conviction for the same type of offense; (2) incarceration for more
than 50 percent of the preceding two years; (3) conviction prior to age 16; (4)
serving time in a state juvenile facility; (5) use of hard drugs in the preceding
two years; (6) use of hard drugs as a juveile; and (7) being employed less
than 50 percent of the preceding two years.
Estrich acknowledges the problems of selective incapacitation, espe-
cially its disparate race effects, but she still embraces it.1°9 Despite its
flaws, the approach seems to embody the kind of improvements that Pro-
fessor Estrich would like to see liberals bring to crime policy-the use of
expertise to maximize the social benefit of punishment, in contrast to the
populist pandering that conservative crime warriors provide.
Her response to the fairness and the race issues is similar to her ap-
proach to racism and the death penalty. As long as it makes sense as
crime policy, the fact that it has unintended racial effects is acceptable.
To the black robber who is sentenced to a particularly long prison term
because he picked up a juvenile record, served time as a juvenile, and
was unemployed a lot-all factors highly correlated with race-the an-
swer is one supported by the moral force of victimization. For Estrich,
"[t]he answer to the black false positive is that we have a right to fight
crime. Would we do the same thing if the false positives were white? Cut
crime, and save prison space? Absolutely."'10
But Estrich's answer is tragically flawed, because it merely dismisses
race in the face of crime once again. Estrich rejects placing any of the re-
sponsibility on those who make race a factor in responding to crime. It is
not police and shopkeepers who make racial judgments as a daily busi-
ness that we should castigate but those black criminals who have pro-
107. See id. at 83.
108. Id. at 89.
109. See id. at 90.
110. Id. at 91.
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vided a core of truth to the statistical case for suspicion of black men."'
This argument echoes Randall Kennedy's recent call for the rallying of
African-American communities to repudiate and distinguish those law
breakers in their midst.12 Estrich relies on our "confidence" in the racial
"neutrality" of these proceedings to suggest that we should live with the
potential errors of judgment made in identifying those most likely to be
involved in crime, yet such reliance is problematic at the very least.
IV. CONCLUSION
No one feels the tightness and distress of the space in which liberal
legal and political thought has found itself more than Susan Estrich. An
eyewitness to the political slaughter of liberals over the crime issue in the
1980s, Estrich knows that liberals have to find their way to broader
ground on these issues. The question is whether allowing the embrace of
punishment to take precedence over the mandate to eliminate the resi-
dues of a government-supported system of racial injustice provides a
resolution.
Whether this is a necessary compromise for electability, as President
Clinton apparently believes, depends on the available alternatives. One
alternative is to address crime fears directly through an embrace of
crime-prevention strategies, both situational strategies aimed at making
victims less vulnerable to offenders and social strategies aimed at reduc-
ing the pool of available offenders. It is clear that even after an aggres-
sive expansion of preventive measures, the need to incapacitate and
punish some offenders will remain, but that does not suggest that incar-
ceration rates would remain as high as they are today.
For most of the twentieth century, the United States experienced a
relatively stable prison incarceration rate of about 100 per 100,000 resi-
dents. 3 But since the 1970s, we have more than quadrupled that figure
to over 400 per 100,00." 4 The embrace of punishment advocated by Clin-
ton and now Estrich 5 could lock us into these high rates for the foresee-
able future. The consequences for a governable democracy are simply
unknown because of the dearth of relevant precedents among societies
with established democratic institutions, but intuition suggests that this
situation would be anything but optimal. We should look for a viable al-
ternative to punishment.
111. See id. at 52-53.
112. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 79.
113. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1997, at 490-91 fig.6.35
(Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1997).
114. See id. In 1997, the rate stood at 445 prisoners per 100,000 resident adults. See id.
115. See ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 67-68.
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While Estrich's primary arguments are lacking in a number of ways,
some of her observations do provide a glimmer of hope that liberals may
one day be able to extricate themselves from the tight place in which they
currently find themselves vis-A-vis issues of crime and race. Estrich's
epilogue meditates on the racial mistrust engendered by the racial differ-
ences in reaction to the Simpson verdict,11 6 She notes that though politics
can sometimes be aggravated by trials and lead to distortions in practice,
criminal law can be a vehicle for compromise and reconciliation. Perhaps,
she suggests, the criminal law, especially the grand spectacle of the mur-
der trial, can help create a common moral standard.
There is a promising possibility here. As Tom Tyler and his col-
leagues have suggested, the very perception that diversity has grown out
of control and produced frightening gaps in the moral standards of dif-
ferent communities leads to demands for greater punitiveness and
greater use of criminal law in resolving social conflicts. If the proce-
dures for resolving criminal cases serve to build confidence in the ability
of a diverse community to reach a satisfying consensus on the quintessen-
tially moral issues raised by criminal law, over time, these procedures
might some day lessen the demand for punitiveness that produced them.
116. See id. at 113-17.
117. See TOM TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 247-48 (1997).
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